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TRIPPING ON THE THRESHOLD:
FEDERAL COURTS’ FAILURE TO OBSERVE




For almost a century, attorneys have debated the role federal law
should play in the enforcement of private arbitration agreements.1
Proponents of a nationalized arbitration law argue that states are too
reluctant to enforce private arbitration agreements. They argue that
the benefits of arbitration—speed, efficiency, and privacy—will not
be realized without a strong national policy in favor of arbitration.2
Critics of a nationalized arbitration law, on the other hand, argue that
nationalization leaves too little room for state lawmaking. They argue
that a national arbitration policy prevents states from enacting impor-
tant laws for the protection of contracting parties.3
Copyright © 2001 by Charles Davant IV.
1. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZA-
TION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 84 (1992) (noting that the impetus to nationalize arbitration law
began as early as 1918).
2. 1 MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4:04 (1996); David P.
Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
623, 651 (1992) (arguing that the Arbitration Act should be read expansively, notwithstanding
federalism concerns, because of the “overwhelming benefits of arbitration”); Henry C. Strick-
land, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: What’s Left for State Ar-
bitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 460 (1992) (noting that expansive interpretation of
the Arbitration Act may be “justified by the statute’s judicial history and beneficial to the
[Act’s] goal of expeditious arbitration enforcement”).
3. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 641 (1996) (“Congress did
not intend to enforce arbitration agreements that had been foisted on ignorant consumers, and
it did not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties.”); Traci L. Jones, Note, State
Law of Contract Formation in the Shadow of the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 DUKE L.J. 651, 677
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In this debate, the proponents of nationalized arbitration have
fared better than the critics. They persuaded Congress in 1925 to en-
act the Federal Arbitration Act,4 a statute that makes arbitration
agreements enforceable in the federal courts.5 More recently, they
persuaded the United States Supreme Court to use the Arbitration
Act to effectively nationalize the law of arbitration. At their behest,
the Court has held that federal law governs virtually any issue in any
dispute in any forum that implicates arbitration in any way.6 Faced
with a long line of nationalist Supreme Court decisions, critics of na-
tionalization quite understandably have been discouraged.7
But even as the critics complain that the Court has become
hopelessly solicitous of the national policy in favor of arbitration, the
Court has quietly delivered them a victory. In 1987, in Perry v. Tho-
mas,8 the Supreme Court indicated that state law, not federal law,
governs the threshold question of whether parties agreed to submit
their disputes to arbitration.9 Ordinary state law principles applicable
to all contracts determine whether a valid arbitration agreement ex-
ists between the parties.10
This Note argues that the federalist aspect of Perry has gone un-
noticed.11 Writers continue to lump Perry together with the Court’s
(1996) (“The broad scope of the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act], combined with the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of its preemptive effect, has severely restricted the ability of states
to regulate arbitration agreements.”).
4. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208 (1994)).
5. The Act states that
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
6. See infra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3, at 641 (stating that the Supreme Court has been se-
duced by the “myth” that the Arbitration Act was intended to apply in state as well as federal
courts); Jones, supra note 3, at 677–78 (criticizing the nationalist reading of the Arbitration
Act).
8. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
9. Id. at 492 n.9.
10. Id.
11. Perry may be an early, unnoticed bellwether of the Rehnquist Court’s “new federal-
ism,” which gained notoriety in the celebrated federalism decisions of the 1990s. See, e.g., Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks the power to subject noncon-
senting states to suit in state court); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Ex-
pense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks the power to abrogate state
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nationalist arbitration decisions,12 and lower federal courts have failed
to heed the federalist teaching of Perry.13 In practice, courts have not
observed controlling state contract law. Instead, they have continued
to invent “federal contract law” to resolve the threshold question of
whether parties agreed to submit to arbitration. Because the federal-
ist aspect of Perry has gone unnoticed, the critics of nationalization
have been denied the fruits of a rare victory.
Part I describes the process of arbitration and the Supreme
Court’s nationalization of arbitration law. It also introduces Perry v.
Thomas. Part II describes a typical fact pattern from construction law
for which Perry should provide the rule of decision. It critiques a re-
cent federal decision in which the court unintentionally “tripped on
the threshold” by failing to apply state law to the question of whether
an arbitration agreement existed.14 Part III considers some reasons
sovereign immunity from trademark infringement lawsuits in federal court); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks the power to require state officers
to execute federal laws); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (limiting Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power on federalism grounds); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 149 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment limits Congress’s power to require states to
take ownership of nuclear waste).
12. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Even the United States Supreme Court may be prone to neglect its own precedents by
failing to apply state contract law. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001)—a case before the Court at the time of this writing—the
Court is considering “whether an employee’s agreement to arbitrate employment-related dis-
putes with an employer bars the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as plaintiff in an
enforcement action against the employer, from obtaining victim-specific remedies for discrimi-
nation against the employee, such as backpay, reinstatement, and damages.” Brief for Petitioner
at I, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401
(2001) (No. 99–1823), available at 2001 WL 603394, at *I. The Court apparently is not consider-
ing the more fundamental question of whether the employee consented to the arbitration
agreement under South Carolina law, even though this question was hotly debated in the ap-
peals court below. Compare Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d at 808–09 (holding that a valid agree-
ment existed), with id. at 813–15 (King, J., dissenting) (arguing that no agreement existed). In
their briefs to the Supreme Court, neither party raised the threshold question of whether a valid
arbitration agreement existed. See Brief for Petitioner, Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, available at
2001 WL 603394; Brief for Respondent, Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, available at 2001 WL
799217. Similarly, the Justices at oral argument appeared to assume that a valid arbitration
agreement existed. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Oct. 10, 2001, appeal of EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (No. 99–1823),
available at 2001 WL 1262396 (reporting that a Justice asked the attorney for the government
whether the Arbitration Act embodies a preference for arbitration “where an arbitration
agreement has been entered into, as it was here”) (emphasis added).
The parties’ reluctance to argue the threshold question before the Supreme Court—
and the Justices’ apparent reluctance to consider it—is unfortunate, since the Fourth Circuit’s de-
cision appears to be a particularly egregious example of a federal court failing to consider con-
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federal courts routinely make this mistake. It explains that the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is difficult for lawyers to un-
derstand, that judges tend to follow precedents that were themselves
wrongly decided, and that courts are persuaded to compel parties to
arbitrate for policy reasons. Part IV argues as a normative matter that
state law, not federal law, should govern determinations of whether
parties agreed to arbitrate. Specifically, the application of state law
protects the parties’ expectations and preserves state sovereignty.
Part V demonstrates that federal courts’ continued treatment of the
threshold question as one of federal law makes it likely that litigants
will face different substantive rules depending on whether they liti-
gate in state or federal court. Lower courts’ error therefore creates
incentives for litigants to forum shop.15
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARBITRATION LAW
A. Nationalization
Arbitration is a process that allows parties voluntarily to refer
their disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by
them to determine the parties’ rights and liabilities.16 Arbitrators’ de-
cisions are subject to very limited grounds of review, and thus are fi-
nal and enforceable in the same manner as a court judgment.17 Be-
cause arbitration can be faster, more confidential, and less expensive
trolling state law in deciding whether an arbitration agreement exists. In deciding the threshold
question, the appeals court ignored the district court’s factual findings and considered no South
Carolina precedent, instead treating the panel’s own assumptions about corporate practices as
dispositive of the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate had been formed. Waffle
House, 193 F.3d at 808–09. The dissenting judge, by contrast, deferred to the district court’s fac-
tual findings and applied contract principles from three South Carolina decisions in finding that
no arbitration agreement existed. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d at 814, 816 (King, J., dissenting)
(citing Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop., 516 S.E.2d 923 (S.C. 1999); Player v. Chandler, 382
S.E.2d 891 (S.C. 1989); and Carolina Amusement Co. v. Conn. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 437 S.E.2d
122 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)).
15. This Note will not address cases decided under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a–270f
(1994). The Miller Act applies when the federal government is the contract owner. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988). In such
cases, the Act limits the rights and remedies of the parties in a manner that provides special pro-
tection for federal subcontractors. Id. To protect federal subcontractors, federal courts show
extra skepticism toward general incorporation by reference to arbitration clauses in Miller Act
cases. Id.; J.S. & H. Constr. Co. v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d 212, 215–17 (5th
Cir. 1973).
16. 1 DOMKE, supra note 2, § 1:01.
17. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 7.
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than litigation, persons planning business transactions often agree in
advance that they will forego litigation and submit to arbitration any
disputes that may arise from the parties’ future dealings.18
Sometimes a party who signed an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes regrets that decision. After a dispute arises, the party may
believe that it would benefit from the delays inherent in litigation or
that lay arbitrators will not take its legal defenses seriously.19 Under
the state common law and arbitration codes that were in effect at the
start of the twentieth century, that party could escape arbitration
quite easily. The party had the right to revoke the arbitration agree-
ment, thereby depriving the arbitrators of their power to make an
award.20 The revoking party then could bring a judicial action on the
underlying dispute.21 Because pre-dispute arbitration agreements
were effectively unenforceable, the benefits of arbitration were not
fully realized.22 Differences between the states’ arbitration laws cre-
ated horizontal forum shopping problems.23
18. 1 DOMKE, supra note 2, § 1:01 (citing Gates v. Ariz. Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 50 (Ariz.
1939)); see also MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 3 (“For a good many years the commercial and fi-
nancial world has felt increasingly beleaguered by the costs of litigation.”).
19. Arbitrators need not have any legal training. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 344. Nor must they resolve disputes in com-
pliance with the parties’ legal rights. Id. at 345.
20. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 20. To be effective, a revocation had to occur before an
award was rendered. Id.; Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federaliza-
tion of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1310–11 nn.27–28 (1985).
21. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 20.
22. Some members of Congress believed that the lackluster enforcement of arbitration
agreements by state courts resulted from the jealous guard courts keep over their jurisdiction.
H.R. REP. NO. 96–68, at 1–2 (1924):
 [The need for the Federal Arbitration Act] arises from . . . the jealousy of the English
courts for their own jurisdiction . . . . This jealousy survived for so long a period that
the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted
with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too
strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment . . . .
23. One proponent of the Federal Arbitration Act, referring to the handling of disputes in
New York, told Congress:
Where they are involved as to New York State jurisdiction pure and simple, we press
for arbitration, and we can get it because there is no difficulty about it; but the mo-
ment the Hudson River separates us, over in New Jersey, and when it is a Jersey case
against a New York case, we can not do so.
A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate Commerce; and A Bill to Make Valid
and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of
Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign
Nations: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 4 (1923) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Presi-
dent, American Arbitration Association).
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Congress sought to remedy these defects in 1925 by enacting the
Federal Arbitration Act.24 The Act makes pre-dispute arbitration
agreements “evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”25 The Act requires
courts to stay court proceedings or compel participation in an arbitra-
tion proceeding upon being satisfied that the issue involved is refer-
able to arbitration under such an agreement.26
During the first three or four decades of the Arbitration Act’s
existence, the Supreme Court (and everyone else) understood that it
was a procedural statute applicable only in the federal courts.27 Most
people accepted that the Act’s sponsors in Congress intended for its
scope to be quite narrow, applying only to cases in admiralty and in
“interstate commerce,” as that term was defined before the New
Deal.28 In short, the Act was considered part of a “truly federal-state
system of arbitration law.”29
The view that the Arbitration Act supplemented, rather than
supplanted, state law began to lose favor in the 1950s. In 1956, the
Supreme Court held in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America30 that
state arbitration law is substantive, not procedural.31 Curiously, this
modest holding had the unintended effect of requiring lower courts to
nationalize arbitration law. It forced courts down a path of logic that
led away from the Arbitration Act’s conceptual origins. If state arbi-
tration law was substantive, then state arbitration law should apply in
federal courts in diversity cases under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
24. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1–16 (1994)).
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
26. Id. §§ 3–4.
27. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 83, 114–15 (noting that the lack of opposition to the Arbi-
tration Act’s enactment is “explicable only if everyone aware of the proposed legislation—
which included, inter alia, all members of the [American Bar Association] who bothered to read
their mail—understood it to be limited to the federal courts”).
28. An advocate of the Federal Arbitration Act, Charles L. Bernheimer, told Congress in
1923 that the federal legislation would follow “the lines of the New York arbitration law, ap-
plying it to the fields wherein there is Federal jurisdiction. These fields are in admiralty and in
foreign and interstate commerce.” Hearing, supra note 23, at 2. No congressman in 1923 could
know how far “interstate commerce” would extend after the Supreme Court’s “switch in time”
paved the way for the New Deal.
29. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 83.
30. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
31. Id. at 202–05.
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kins,32 unless federal law preempted it. As everyone knew, the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act—not state arbitration law—applied in federal
courts in diversity cases. Therefore, the lower courts held, the Federal
Arbitration Act must preempt state arbitration law.33 In 1967, less
than ten years after lower courts first grappled with this syllogism, the
Supreme Court endorsed it in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.34 This decision transformed the Arbitration Act
into a national regulatory statute, superseding state law under the Su-
premacy Clause of the federal Constitution. As one critic later noted,
“[t]his mutation from a system in which state law was the foundation
and federal law but an important adjunct had occurred with singularly
little debate and with virtually no democratic input.”35
In subsequent decades, the Supreme Court completed the na-
tionalization of arbitration law.36 The Court held that the Act creates
a body of federal substantive law;37 that the Act requires courts to in-
terpret arbitration agreements mindful of the “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements,” notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural laws to the contrary;38 that the Act preempts state
law hostile to arbitration;39 that the Act applies in both state and fed-
eral courts;40 and that the Act renders enforceable any arbitration
agreement that Congress could regulate without exceeding the practi-
cally negligible limits on its interstate commerce power.41
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406–07 (2d Cir. 1959)
(“[C]ongress intended by the Arbitration Act to create a new body of federal substantive law
affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements. . . . [This is] national law
equally applicable in state or federal courts.”).
34. 388 U.S. 395, 404–05 (1967).
35. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 139.
36. Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1305–06 (“The Court has put its imprimatur on a federali-
zation of arbitration law comparable to its role in the dramatic evolution of labor arbitration in
the early 1960’s.”).
37. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The Ar-
bitration Act does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 or otherwise. Id. at 25 n.32. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration only
when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute;
hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal juris-
diction before an order can issue. Id.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1996).
40. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1984).
41. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987). The Supreme Court’s transformation of the
Federal Arbitration Act into a national regulatory statute did not occur without criticism. Jus-
tice O’Connor accused the Court majority of abandoning “all pretense of ascertaining congres-
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Despite the Supreme Court’s march toward nationalism, none of
its decisions squarely faced the question of whether federal or state
law governs the threshold issue of the parties’ consent to a valid arbi-
tration agreement. But lower courts interpreted the Supreme Court’s
nationalist, pro-arbitration rhetoric to mean that state law had no role
in disputes over arbitration agreements.42 In determining whether a
party had agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, lower courts pur-
ported to apply “federal contract law” or “generally accepted princi-
ples of contract law.”43
B. Perry v. Thomas: A Revolution Unrecognized
It was against this background that the Supreme Court in 1987
decided Perry v. Thomas.44 In Perry, the former employee of a securi-
sional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edi-
fice of its own creation.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that the Court “has effectively rewritten the
statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend.” Perry, 482 U.S. at
493 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 135, 121 S. Ct.
1302, 1315 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]either the history of the drafting of the original
bill by the ABA, nor the records of the deliberations in Congress during the years preceding the
ultimate enactment of the Act in 1925, contains any evidence that the proponents of the legisla-
tion intended it to apply to agreements affecting employment.”); id. at 1318–22 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (“The Court has no good reason, therefore, to reject a reading of ‘engaged in’ as an ex-
pression of intent to legislate to the full extent of the commerce power over employment
contracts.”); Southland, 465 U.S. at 19–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Surely the general language
of the Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements are valid does not mean that all such agree-
ments are valid irrespective of their purpose or effect.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Fere-
john, Super Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1260 (2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court has construed the
[Arbitration Act] broadly, with a breadth sweeping well beyond the statute’s plain meaning and
the probable expectations of its framers in 1925.”). Professors Carrington and Haagen have sug-
gested that the Supreme Court is “so absorbed in matters of seemingly greater public moment
that its members have failed to attune themselves to the values and the realities of private law.”
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 19, at 338. Moreover, they have called the opinion of the
Court in Southland an “extraordinarily disingenuous” manipulation of the history of the 1925
Act. Id. at 380.
42. Consider, for example, Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987):
In enacting the federal Arbitration Act, Congress created national substantive law
governing questions of the validity and the enforceability of arbitration agreements
under its coverage. Hence whether Genesco is bound by the arbitration clause of the
sales confirmation forms is determined under federal law, which comprises generally
accepted principles of contract law.
Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
43. See, e.g., Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys. Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that federal law governed the question of whether separate agreements should be construed to-
gether to determine if an arbitration agreement has been formed); Genesco, 815 F.2d at 845
(binding a party to an arbitration agreement printed on the back of a sales confirmation form).
44. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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ties brokerage firm sued his former employer and two coworkers, al-
leging that he was owed commissions on the sale of securities.45 Al-
though the parties had signed an agreement to arbitrate future dis-
putes, the plaintiff sought to avoid arbitration on the ground that the
California Labor Code authorized him to maintain an action for the
commissions, without regard to the existence of any private agree-
ment to arbitrate.46 The Court rejected his argument.47 It held that the
Federal Arbitration Act was in “unmistakable conflict” with the Cali-
fornia statute, so the state statute had to give way.48
Because the Perry Court held that federal law preempted a state
law, scholars tend to lump the decision together with the nationalist
decisions that preceded it. For example, one scholar has referred to
the “ringing march-to-the-federal-flag tone of cases like Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (U.S. 1983),
Southland Corp. v. Keating (U.S. 1984), Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd (U.S. 1985), and Perry v. Thomas (U.S. 1987).”49 Another
scholar included Perry in the “trilogy of opinions” by the Supreme
Court that sharply narrowed the role of state arbitration law.50
Despite this conventional wisdom, Perry is better described as a
federalist departure from its predecessors. Although Perry’s result
and tone may seem nationalist (it quotes extensively from its nation-
alist predecessors),51 the decision’s meaning is far more nuanced.
Perry was the first Supreme Court decision to indicate (albeit in
dicta) that under the Federal Arbitration Act, federal and state courts
should apply ordinary state contract principles to determine whether
an agreement to arbitrate is valid, revocable, or enforceable:
We note, however, the choice-of-law issue that arises when defenses
such as Thomas’ so-called “standing” and unconscionability argu-
ments are asserted. In instances such as these, the text of [Federal
Arbitration Act] § 2 provides the touchstone for choosing between
state-law principles and the principles of federal common law envi-
45. Id. at 484–85.
46. Id. at 486.
47. Id. at 491–92.
48. Id. at 491.
49. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 154 (italics added) (footnotes omitted).
50. The other two decisions were Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Jones, supra
note 3, at 651.
51. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489–91 (citing Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
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sioned by the passage of that statute: An agreement to arbitrate is
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, “save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial ori-
gin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the va-
lidity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.52
Federal law preempts state contract law only when the applicable
state principles take their “meaning precisely from the fact that a con-
tract to arbitrate is at issue”53—in other words, when the state law is
specifically hostile to arbitration.
This federalist reading of Perry was implicitly confirmed in a sub-
sequent decision. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,54
the Supreme Court cited precedent from Illinois, the forum state and
place where the disputed contract was executed, and from New York,
the state designated in the contract’s choice-of-law clause, in inter-
preting a contract.55 In a later decision, First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan,56 the Court explicitly confirmed this reading of Perry. In
that decision, the Court stated: “When deciding whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts
generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern
the formation of contracts.”57 The Court then noted that Illinois pro-
vided the law relevant to that dispute.58
52. Id. at 492 n.9 (citations omitted). Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Scalia. Id. at 483.
Justices Stevens and O’Connor dissented. Id. at 483.
53. Id. at 493 n.9; see also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1996)
(holding that any state law that “places arbitration agreements in a class apart from ‘any con-
tract,’ and singularly limits their validity” is preempted by federal law).
54. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
55. Id. at 63.
56. 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
57. Id.
58. Id. In the years since 1987, only a handful of lower federal courts have recognized this
federalist feature of Perry. See, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional
de Venez., 991 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that, although the Arbitration Act preempts
state law that treats arbitration agreements differently from any other contracts, it also “‘pre-
serves general principles of state contract law as rules of decision on whether the parties have
entered into an agreement to arbitrate’” (quoting Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 1177, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))); W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Sch. Bd., 980 F.2d 253, 258–59 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that federal courts cannot order parties to arbitrate if there is no valid arbi-
tration agreement and that state law governs whether a valid arbitration agreement has been
formed); Cione v. Foresters Equity Servs., Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that, even if one of the parties contends that the Arbitration Act applies to their
agreement to arbitrate, the Act does not apply until the existence of an enforceable arbitration
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The federalist reading of Perry is wholly consistent with recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence in other areas. Beginning in the late
1980s, the Rehnquist Court embarked on a much-remarked “new
federalism” program, reviving federalism-based limits on Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.59 The Rehnquist Court also construed some federal
statutes narrowly, mindful of federalism concerns.60 Perry thus can be
seen as a harbinger of the Court’s new states’ rights campaign.
Perry’s instruction that courts should apply ordinary state con-
tract law to the threshold question of whether parties agreed to arbi-
trate should be significant to critics of a nationalized arbitration pol-
icy for several reasons. First, it means that courts must stop
employing a presumption in favor of arbitration when deciding
whether parties agreed to arbitrate.61 Second, it means that state con-
tract principles that render certain types of agreements unenforce-
able—such as unconscionable contracts—can invalidate arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding federal arbitration law.62 Third, it abol-
ishes the “federal common law” of contract that federal courts were
fashioning—in contravention of the federalist principles underlying
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins63—to govern the threshold question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.64 Fourth, it means that liti-
gants can no longer forum shop to profit from advantageous rules of
law.65 These consequences of applying state law are described in Parts
IV and V.
II.  FEDERAL COURTS’ FAILURE TO APPLY STATE LAW
Federalism’s quiet victory in Perry has gone unnoticed. In the
academy, scholars have not written about it. In courtrooms, litigants
have not raised it. A survey of recent federal court decisions shows
that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of state law in arbitration is a
revolution unrecognized. Federal courts have continued to disregard
agreement is established under state law principles involving formation, revocation, and en-
forcement of contracts generally).
59. See supra note 11.
60. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (restricting fed-
eral court jurisdiction in lawsuits in which federal and state law questions are mixed).
61. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part IV.B.
63. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
64. See infra Part IV.A.
65. See infra Part V.
DAVANT.DOC 12/03/01 9:28 AM
532 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:521
state law when deciding the threshold question of whether parties
agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration.66 This Part describes a
typical fact pattern from construction law for which Perry should pro-
vide the rule of decision. It also examines a recent federal appeals
court decision that exemplifies federal courts’ neglect of state law.67
A. A Typical Fact Pattern: Binding a Contract Nonsignatory to an
Arbitration Agreement
The threshold question of whether a party agreed to be bound by
a contract’s arbitration clause often arises in the context of the non-
signatory. In the typical case, one of two parties who signed an
agreement containing an arbitration clause seeks to compel a third
party who did not sign the agreement to participate in arbitration.68 It
is well settled that nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement may be
bound according to ordinary principles of (1) incorporation by refer-
ence,69 (2) assumption,70 (3) agency,71 (4) veil-piercing,72 and (5) estop-
pel.73 Federal courts have erred by failing to apply state law to the
66. E.g., Keystone Shipping Co. v. New England Power Co., 109 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding, solely on the basis of federal case law, that the plaintiff was contractually bound to
arbitration); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 992 F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 1993)
(same); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507, 1507–08 (11th
Cir. 1988) (same); O’Connor & Co., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 697 F. Supp. 563, 564–67 (D.
Mass. 1988) (same); Cianbro Corp. y Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria v. Technologia, S.A., 697
F. Supp. 15, 17–20 (D. Me. 1988) (same).
67. Another interesting phenomenon (beyond the scope of this Note) is the tendency of
state courts to make the same mistake the federal courts have made. When faced with an allega-
tion that the Arbitration Act applies, state courts may disregard their own contract law prece-
dents in favor of poorly reasoned federal precedent. Because the Supreme Court has held that
the Arbitration Act is applicable in state as well as federal courts, state courts incorrectly may
assume that “federal contract law” is binding on them.
68. In one variation on the typical case, the nonsignatory may seek to compel a signatory to
arbitrate. In that case, the inquiry is the same: Did the signatory and the nonsignatory agree to
submit their dispute to arbitration? Are the signatory and nonsignatory in privity?
69. E.g., Keystone Shipping, 109 F.3d at 51.
70. E.g., Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir.
1999).
71. E.g., Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1281 (6th Cir. 1990).
72. E.g., J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320–21 (4th
Cir. 1988) (“When the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the
same facts and are inherently inseperable, a court may refer claims against the parent to arbitra-
tion even though the parent is not formally a party to the arbitration agreement.”).
73. E.g., Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d
88, 97 (2d Cir. 1999).
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threshold question in each of these five contexts.74 The remainder of
this Note discusses this error in the context of the incorporation-by-
reference cases (even though its analysis is equally valid in the other
four contexts). The incorporation-by-reference cases provide a good
example of this error, because they involve a relatively simple fact
pattern familiar to practitioners.
Disputes about the incorporation by reference of arbitration
clauses most frequently arise in the context of construction agree-
ments.75 There are two reasons this is so. First, more than almost any
other industry, the construction industry has made use of arbitration
as a means of settling disputes.76 Second, large construction projects
require multiple layers of contractual relationships among owners,
developers, contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, lessors,
sureties, and others.77 Although these parties do not intend to be in
direct contractual privity with every other party, they often are joined
by a complex web of incorporations by reference.78
For an ordinary construction project, a developer and a general
contractor sign a construction agreement containing an arbitration
clause.79 The general contractor then enters into contractual relation-
ships with other parties, such as subcontractors and sureties.80 In most
cases, the subcontract or performance bond does not contain an arbi-
tration clause but does contain a provision incorporating by reference
the underlying construction agreement.81 Oftentimes, the perform-
ance bond or subcontract contains language that suggests litigation is
the agreed-upon method for resolving disputes82—a feature that
automatically puts the secondary agreement at odds with the primary.
The question presented by these cases is whether the incorporation
74. E.g., Keystone Shipping, 109 F.3d at 51 (incorporation by reference); Tencara Shipyard,
170 F.3d at 353 (assumption); Arnold, 920 F.2d at 1281 (agency); J.J. Ryan & Sons, 863 F.2d at
320–21 (veil-piercing); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757–58
(11th Cir. 1993) (estoppel).
75. J. Michael Franks & John W. Heacock, Arbitration and the Contract Surety: Inclusion




79. Id. at 980 n.18.
80. Id. at 980.
81. Id. at 981.
82. E.g., Am. Inst. of Architects, Document A312: Performance Bond and Payment Bond 2
(1984) (“Any proceeding, legal or equitable, under this Bond may be instituted in any court of
competent jurisdiction in the location in which the work or part of the work is located . . . .”).
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by reference binds a surety83 (or guarantor) or subcontractor to sub-
mit to arbitration or whether the reference to the underlying contract
merely serves to define the scope, quality, character, and manner of
the nonsignatory’s performance.84
This question has become dismayingly common in construction
disputes because the standard form contracts drafted by the Ameri-
can Institute of Architects and used by most contractors85 follow this
pattern.86 Because these contracts are ambiguous when construed to-
gether, litigation over which parties consented to an arbitration clause
has become a standard part of many construction disputes.
B. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. West Point
Construction Co., Inc.
The Eleventh Circuit’s 1988 decision in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. West Point Construction Co.87 is notable for two rea-
sons. First, although the case was decided almost a year after Perry,
the Eleventh Circuit failed to observe controlling state contract law.
Second, United States Fidelity has become the leading case on the
question of whether a surety or subcontractor is bound to arbitrate
disputes arising out of an underlying agreement that is incorporated
by reference in a performance bond or subcontract. Courts have per-
83. In a contract of surety or guaranty, the surety or guarantor have promised to answer for
the debt or default of a third person. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 11 (1999). Both are accessory
contracts. Id. In fact, “[s]ome authorities hold that a contract of guaranty is not distinguishable
from a contract of suretyship, and the distinction has sometimes been repealed by statute.” Id.
84. In other words, A and B sign an agreement containing an arbitration clause. B and C
then sign a collateral agreement (a subcontract or performance bond) that incorporates the
main agreement by reference. Disputes arise, and A seeks to compel C to submit to arbitration.
C resists arbitration on the ground that no agreement to arbitrate exists between C and A.
85. Franks & Heacock, supra note 74, at 980 n.18 (“The standard form documents pre-
pared by the American Institute of Architects . . . are heavily relied upon and have virtually be-
come scripture in the construction industry.”).
86. See Am. Inst. of Architects, Document A20 1–1997: General Conditions of the Con-
tract for Construction § 4.6.2 (1997) [hereinafter Am. Inst. of Architects, General Conditions]
(the American Institute of Architects standard form construction agreement between an owner
and contractor) (providing that disputes “arising out of or related to the Contract” shall be re-
solved in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association); Am. Inst. of Architects, Document A311/CM: Performance Bond and La-
bor and Material Payment Bond 1 (1980) [hereinafter Am. Inst. of Architects, Performance
Bond] (incorporating by reference the construction agreement); see also Am. Inst. of Architects,
supra note 82, at 2 (incorporating by reference the construction agreement).
87. 837 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1988).
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petuated United States Fidelity’s error by following its holding more
than twenty times.88
In United States Fidelity, West Point Construction Company was
a general contractor building the Lee County Justice Center in Ala-
bama.89 West Point hired a subcontractor to paint.90 When the painter
defaulted on its contract with West Point, West Point sought to insti-
tute arbitration proceedings against United States Fidelity, the pain-
ter’s surety.91 United States Fidelity opposed arbitration.92 The sub-
contract between West Point and the painter included an arbitration
clause, but the performance bond issued by United States Fidelity did
not.93 The performance bond did, however, incorporate the subcon-
tract by reference.94 Although United States Fidelity never signed any
document containing an arbitration clause, the Eleventh Circuit held,
as a matter of federal law, that the incorporation of a subcontract by
reference into a performance bond expresses an intention of the par-
ties, including the surety, to arbitrate disputes.95
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision cannot be reconciled with Perry.
The court did not consider Alabama or any other state’s contract law,
even though the question of whether the parties intended to be bound
by the arbitration clause unquestionably concerned the “validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally”96 and should
have been governed by state contract law. The Alabama contract
principles that should have governed the transaction—principles
dealing with the parties’ intentions and whether there was a “meeting
of the minds”—do not take their “meaning precisely from the fact
that a contract to arbitrate is at issue,”97 nor do they place “arbitration
agreements in a class apart from ‘any contract,’ and singularly limit[]
88. United States Fidelity has been followed at least twenty-three times. See, e.g., Rashid v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., CIV.A.No. 2:9 1–0141, 1992 WL 565341, at *7 (S.D. W. Va.
Sept. 28, 1992); Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Collins & Co., Gen. Contr., Inc., 735 F. Supp.
1050, 1051 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Cianbro Corp. v. Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria y Technologia,
S.A., 697 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. Me. 1988).




93. Id. at 1508.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 428 U.S. at 493 n.9; see supra note 52 (indicating the opinions of the individual Jus-
tices).
97. Id.
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their validity.”98 So they are not preempted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.99 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit ignored state law: it
cited two federal court decisions as precedent, distinguished five fed-
eral court decisions as not relevant, and cited no state court deci-
sions.100
What prompted the Eleventh Circuit to neglect the choice-of-law
analysis prescribed by Perry? As an initial matter, the surety’s lawyers
probably did not think to raise the issue. Because of the Supreme
Court’s nationalization of arbitration law, lawyers tend to assume that
state law no longer has any role in disputes over arbitration. The fed-
eralism aspect of Perry is subtle, and, for reasons explained in Part
III, it has remained below the radar of most practitioners. Second, the
Eleventh Circuit followed federal court decisions rendered before
Perry that were exactly on point. The Eleventh Circuit noted that its
holding was “consistent with” Exchange Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Haskell Co.,101 “in which the Sixth Circuit held under almost identical
circumstances that the surety was bound to arbitrate by virtue of the
incorporation into the performance bond of a subcontract which itself
incorporated an arbitration clause.”102 Although the litigants probably
did not notify the court of the fact, the Sixth Circuit decided Ex-
change Mutual three years before the Supreme Court decided Perry.
Perry superceded Exchange Mutual. Exchange Mutual therefore was
not a reliable authority for the proposition that the question of the
parties’ intent is to be decided as a matter of federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit in United States Fidelity attempted to but-
tress its decision by referring to “the strong policy favoring arbitration
expressed by Congress in the Federal Arbitration Act.”103 Courts typi-
cally invoke this “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”—which
the Supreme Court first announced in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hos-
pital v. Mercury Construction Corp.104—to put a thumb on the scale in
98. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
99. See Cione v. Foresters Equity Servs., Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that even if one of the parties contends that the Arbitration Act applies to their agree-
ment to arbitrate, federal law does not apply until the existence of an enforceable arbitration
agreement is established under state law principles involving formation, revocation, and en-
forcement of contracts generally).
100. United States Fid., 837 F.2d at 1508.
101. 742 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1984).
102. United States Fid., 837 F.2d at 1508.
103. Id.
104. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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favor of the party seeking arbitration.105 But after Perry, this use of
the federal government’s pro-arbitration presumption is error. The
federal presumption should not be permitted to taint the threshold
question of whether an arbitration agreement exists, a pure question
of state law. Under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, “‘any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like de-
fense to arbitrability.’”106 The question of whether a valid arbitration
agreement exists is not a question about the scope of arbitrable issues.
The scope of arbitrable issues is not implicated until after a court has
decided an agreement exists.
In United States Fidelity, the Eleventh Circuit should not have in-
voked the federal presumption in deciding whether the contractor
and the surety intended to submit their disputes to arbitration. Once
the court decided an arbitration agreement existed under state law,
however, it would have been proper to invoke the presumption in
finding (for example) that the arbitration agreement included within
its scope disputes over the timeliness of the painter’s performance.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach has been influential, notwith-
standing the fact that it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s instruction
in Perry. Federal courts have followed United States Fidelity in droves,
deciding as a matter of federal law that a valid arbitration agreement
exists when a subcontract or performance bond incorporates by ref-
erence a contract containing an arbitration clause. In recent years, the
Seventh Circuit in Gingiss International, Inc. v. Bormet107 and Grund-
stad v. Ritt,108 the First Circuit in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v.
105. See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The issue
of arbitrability must be analyzed in light of the strong public policy favoring arbitration . . . .”).
106. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)
(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25) (emphasis added).
107. 58 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995). In Gingiss, the Seventh Circuit ignored state law in deciding
that guarantors were bound by the arbitration clause in a franchise agreement they had not
signed, because the guaranty incorporated by reference the franchise agreement. Id. at 331. The
court cited a 1985 Fourth Circuit decision, Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d
974, 978 (4th Cir. 1985), and a 1984 Sixth Circuit decision, Exchange Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Haskell Co., 742 F.2d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that “[u]nder federal law, a
subcontract with a guarantor or surety may incorporate a duty to arbitrate by reference to an
arbitration clause in a general contract.” Gingiss, 58 F.3d at 331–32 (emphasis added). The
shareholders therefore were obligated to arbitrate. Id.
108. 106 F.3d 201 (7th Cir. 1997). The Grundstad court disregarded the Supreme Court’s
instruction that federal courts must as a threshold matter apply state law to determine whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate. Id. at 204–05. The court did not cite a single state court decision.
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Gilbane Building Co.,109 a federal district court in New Jersey in
Hoffman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,110 a federal district court in Maine
in Cianbro Corp. v. Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria y Technologia,
S.A.,111 and a federal district court in Massachusetts in Thomas
O’Connor & Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America112 all failed to ap-
ply state law at the threshold.
Even more courts have made the same error in contexts having
nothing to do with incorporation by reference. For example, the
Ninth Circuit has held that federal law, not state law, governs the
question of whether an arbitration agreement is an adhesion con-
tract113 and that the Arbitration Act creates a single, unified body of
federal law that governs all defenses against the validity of an arbitra-
tion agreement.114 Neither of these decisions can be reconciled with
Perry or the Supreme Court decisions that followed it.
Instead, the court followed a decision from another federal circuit (a decision that also failed to
apply state law). Id.
109. 992 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1993). The Gilbane court decided that a performance bond (with
no arbitration clause) that, in turn, incorporated by reference a subcontract (with no arbitration
clause) that incorporated by reference a prime contract (containing an arbitration clause) cre-
ated a “chain of incorporation” sufficient to bind the general contractor to arbitrate its disputes
with the surety. Id. at 388–89. In reaching that result, the First Circuit ignored applicable state
law (from Massachusetts), cited the “strong federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” and
followed an old Sixth Circuit decision. See id. (citing Exch. Mut., 742 F.2d at 275–76).
110. 734 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.J. 1990). The Hoffman court applied “federal substantive law” to
the threshold inquiry to find that a surety was bound to an arbitration agreement between a
contractor and a real estate owner. Id. at 194. The court noted that “federal policy favors arbi-
tration and dictates liberal construction of arbitration clauses.” Id. at 195. It observed that “the
Eleventh, Sixth, Fifth, Second, and First Circuits, and several district courts, ha[d] required sure-
ties to arbitrate issues relating to a performance bond where the performance bond incorpo-
rate[d] by reference a contract containing an arbitration clause.” Id. at 194. The court ignored
the relevant state law from New Jersey, even though New Jersey courts had considered the ex-
act issue presented. See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
111. 697 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988). In ordering a surety to arbitrate based on an incorpora-
tion by reference, the Cianbro court ignored state law, cited a “healthy regard for the federal
policy [favoring] arbitration,” and followed a series of federal decisions from other circuits,
none more recent than 1984, except for the Eleventh Circuit’s suspicious 1988 decision in United
States Fidelity. Id. at 17–19 (citing United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837
F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1988)). For a criticism of United States Fidelity, see supra notes 87–106 and
accompanying text.
112. 697 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1988). In holding that a subcontractor was bound to the ar-
bitration agreement in an underlying agreement incorporated by reference into the subcontract,
a federal district court in Massachusetts made no mention of state law and instead cited a 1975
First Circuit decision and a 1984 Sixth Circuit decision. Id. at 565 (citing Exch. Mut., 742 F.2d at
274, and J & S Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1975)).
113. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992).
114. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Neal
v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal law gov-
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III.  EXPLAINING THE FAILURE TO OBSERVE STATE LAW
There are two main reasons federal courts continue to apply fed-
eral contract law to the threshold question of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate. First, the law in this area is exceptionally difficult
and confusing, Perry v. Thomas notwithstanding. Second, there are
some good (though ultimately unpersuasive) policy arguments for
following cases like United States Fidelity.
A. The Supreme Court’s Jungle of Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence is a
challenge to understand and apply, particularly with respect to
choice-of-law questions. For that reason, lawyers typically assume
(and tell judges) that federal law governs the threshold question. The
Supreme Court frequently states that the Arbitration Act creates a
“body of federal substantive law” establishing and regulating the duty
to honor an agreement to arbitrate.115 While this is undoubtedly true,
some lower courts have interpreted this statement broadly to mean
that the Act authorizes courts to fashion federal common law to gov-
ern the threshold question of whether the parties entered into an
agreement to arbitrate.116 These courts have purported to follow Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,117 a 1985 Su-
preme Court decision that appears to endorse the application of fed-
eral law to the threshold inquiry. The Court in Mitsubishi stated:
[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is
to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.
The court is to make this determination by applying the “federal
erned the question of whether separate agreements should be construed together to determine
if an arbitration agreement had been formed); Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 CIV.
1613 (DLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1140, at *9–*10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (holding that courts
must apply federal substantive law to determine arbitrability); In re Milliken & Co., No. 92 CIV.
0773 (CSH), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11195, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1992) (“[T]he Second Cir-
cuit has clearly stated that whether parties are bound by an arbitration clause under the [Arbi-
tration Act] is determined by federal law, not state law.”).
115. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
116. Neal, 918 F.2d at 37 n.5; Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir.
1987) (binding a party to an arbitration agreement printed on the back of a sales confirmation
form).
117. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agree-
ment within the coverage of the Act.”118
The Court’s statement must be read within the context of Mitsubishi’s
facts. In Mitsubishi, neither the formation nor the existence of the ar-
bitration agreement was at issue. In fact, the Mitsubishi Court as-
sumed the existence of such an agreement.119 The only issue was
whether a court should enforce an agreement to resolve a certain type
of claim—antitrust claims—by arbitration.120 The issue concerned not
the existence of the agreement, but the scope of the agreement. The
language of Mitsubishi (“the first task of a court asked to compel arbi-
tration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbi-
trate that dispute”)121 is relevant not to the threshold inquiry, but to
the question of whether a particular dispute falls within the ambit of
an arbitration agreement. Nonetheless, lawyers and courts can be for-
given for failing to draw so fine a distinction.
Lower courts also have been misled by the generous, pro-
arbitration rhetoric that has accompanied Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the scope of arbitrable disputes. For example, the Su-
preme Court noted in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers of America:122
[W]here the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a pre-
sumption of arbitrability in the sense that “[a]n order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of coverage.”123
The language in AT&T Technologies, Inc., like the language in Mit-
subishi, refers to the scope of the agreement, not to the threshold
question of its existence.
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University,124 the Supreme Court stated that “in ap-
118. Id. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
119. Id. at 628 (“We now turn to consider whether Soler’s antitrust claims are nonarbitrable
even though it has agreed to arbitrate them.”).
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
122. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
123. Id. at 650 (assuming the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate) (quoting United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)) (emphasis added).
124. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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plying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the in-
terpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act,
due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration,
and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself re-
solved in favor of arbitration.”125 Despite its appearance, this language
does not support the proposition that the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration is relevant to the threshold inquiry. Neither the existence nor
the formation of the arbitration agreement was disputed in Volt. The
Court assumed at the outset that such an agreement existed and that
the agreement was “within the scope of the Act.”126 The only reason
that state law was at issue in Volt was because the parties specifically
incorporated California law into their arbitration agreement.127 The
Court therefore applied California law (with due regard to the federal
policy) to the interpretation of the contract, not to the threshold in-
quiry of whether it existed. Again, lower courts can be forgiven for
overreading the federal policy in favor of arbitration.
None of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the Arbitra-
tion Act appeared to endorse any role for state law before the 1987
decision in Perry v. Thomas.128 Perry states clearly that “state law,
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose
to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforce-
ability of contracts generally.”129 Nonetheless, this language is not very
prominent in the opinion. The language appears in a footnote, and it
often is overshadowed by the Court’s robust explanation of what state
law does not apply: state principles hostile to arbitration.130 Only a
handful of lower courts have recognized that Perry instructed them to
apply state law to the threshold inquiry.131 It was not until First Op-
125. Id. at 475–76 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 475.
127. Id. at 470.
128. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
129. Id. at 493 n.9.
130. Id.
131. E.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venez., 991 F.2d 42,
46 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that although “the Arbitration Act preempts state law which treats
arbitration agreements differently from any other contracts, it also ‘preserves general principles
of state contract law as rules of decision on whether the parties have entered into an agreement
to arbitrate’”) (quoting Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (S.D.N.Y.
1988)); Cione v. Foresters Equity Servs., Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that, even if one of the parties contends that the Arbitration Act applies to their
agreement to arbitrate, the Act does not apply until the existence of an enforceable arbitration
agreement is established under state law principles involving formation, revocation, and en-
forcement of contracts generally).
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tions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan132 in 1995 that the Supreme Court
remedied this shortcoming. In First Options, the Court clearly and
prominently stated: “When deciding whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . .
should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation
of contracts.”133
In light of this minefield of Supreme Court precedent, it is little
wonder that lower courts mistakenly fashion federal common law to
govern the threshold inquiry of whether an arbitration agreement ex-
isted between the parties.
The lower courts’ error has perpetuated itself. When faced with
the jungle of jurisprudence the Supreme Court has established during
the last twenty years, courts seeking clarity have found it in prece-
dents like United States Fidelity.134 Lower courts have latched onto the
clear—but (it now seems) clearly wrong—rules laid down in United
States Fidelity and its progeny.135 Bad law has multiplied.
B. Policy Arguments in Favor of a Federal Rule of Decision
Another likely explanation for lower courts’ failure to apply state
contract principles to the threshold inquiry is the fact that per se fed-
eral contract rules of the kind laid down in United States Fidelity ap-
pear attractive from a policy standpoint, at least at first glance. The
existence of a single, nationwide, federal rule of decision could sim-
plify both the ex ante planning of contractual relations and the ex
post resolution of disputes. Local rules, on the other hand, require ex-
tensive legal research and factfinding, increasing the costs, unpredict-
ability, and delays associated with adjudication. The purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act is to minimize such problems.
Some judges may be concerned that the application of state law
will treat the threshold question as fact-bound and, therefore, appro-
132. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
133. Id. at 944. The Court reserved one qualification to the general rule that state law gov-
erns the threshold inquiry. When courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators
should decide arbitrability, state law does not apply to that question. Rather, courts should fol-
low the federal rule that parties have not agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clear
and unmistakable evidence” that they did so. Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communica-
tions Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
134. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir.
1988).
135. United States Fidelity has been cited more than twenty times. See supra note 88 and ac-
companying text.
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priate for decision by a jury.136 Empanelling a jury to decide the
threshold issue of whether the parties agreed to forego judicial deci-
sionmaking seems contrary to the Act’s core purpose of allowing par-
ties to agree to select a less costly alternative to litigation, and then to
proceed in that alternative forum without delay imposed in the
courts.137 Also, juries would be required to consider potentially unreli-
able parol evidence as to the parties’ intentions. Moreover, turning
the threshold question over to jurors could cast doubt on the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements, thereby discouraging trade and
squandering scarce judicial resources.138 And federal judges who com-
plain about swollen court dockets may find that discouraging jury tri-
als lightens their load.139
Courts that followed United States Fidelity and applied its federal
rule of decision may have been concerned that applying state contract
principles would cause waste for other reasons, in addition to the
waste associated with empanelling a jury. For example, if courts did
not follow the United States Fidelity rule—that a performance bond’s
reference to the underlying agreement binds the surety to its arbitra-
tion clause—plaintiffs might be forced to proceed against the princi-
pal and the surety in separate forums (the principal in the arbitration
forum, the surety in court). Factfinding would occur simultaneously in
both forums, causing redundancy. This result might appear especially
obnoxious because in some jurisdictions the liability of the surety and
the principal are coextensive.140 Because the surety stands in the shoes
136. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 19, at 397. For an example of a case that should have
treated the threshold determination as fact-bound, see infra note 185 and accompanying text.
137. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974) (“The United States Ar-
bitration Act . . . was designed to allow parties to avoid ‘the costliness and delays of litiga-
tion’ . . . .”) (citation omitted); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
404 (1967) (referring to “the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration pro-
cedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and ob-
struction in the courts”).
138. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 19, at 332 (noting that encouraging trade and pre-
serving judicial resources are among the purported benefits of arbitration).
139. See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the
Act was “therapy for the ailment of the crowded docket”). But see Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886
P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (noting that the First Circuit’s
opinion in Securities Industry Ass’n illustrated “an all too frequent preoccupation on the part of
federal judges with their own case load and a total lack of consideration for the rights of indi-
viduals”), vacated and remanded by 515 U.S. 1129 (1995), reaff’d and reinstated by 901 P.2d 596
(Mont. 1995), rev’d 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
140. E.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Larkin Gen. Hosp., Ltd., 593 So. 2d 195, 198 (Fla.
1992).
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of the principal, it should be subject to the same rights and remedies
as the principal—and in the same forum.
Application of state law also might encourage parties to attempt
to evade arbitration, the agreed-upon procedure for resolving dis-
putes, by introducing the identical controversy in a judicial forum.
Congress enacted the Arbitration Act to make dispute resolution
cheaper and faster; such piecemeal adjudication threatens to make it
more costly and time-consuming. Moreover, piecemeal adjudication
risks creating inconsistent judgments. For example, a developer could
win a court judgment against the surety, but lose in the arbitration
proceeding against the principal contractor. Inconsistent results are
minimized if the surety is compelled to participate in arbitration
alongside the principal.
Although these arguments are compelling, they must be taken
with a grain of salt. It is true that the Arbitration Act was intended to
lower the costs of adjudication,141 but it is not true that the Act was in-
tended to abridge the right to jury trial. In fact, where a party denies
having agreed to arbitration, the Act explicitly affirms the right to
jury trial, except in admiralty cases:142
If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or
refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the
party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within
admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such is-
sue.143
The Arbitration Act is not offended by a jury or judge weighing the
evidence to determine whether the parties intended to forego a judi-
cial forum for the resolution of disputes. Therefore, it is inappropriate
for a court to adopt on policy grounds a federal contract rule in lieu of
conducting a fact-intensive inquiry into the parties’ intentions.
Moreover, the Supreme Court on two occasions has downplayed
concerns about piecemeal adjudication, while underscoring the im-
portance of the parties’ intentions. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hos-
pital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,144 the Court held that a hospital’s
claim against a contractor was subject to arbitration, but the hospital’s
141. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510–11.
142. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 19, at 349.
143. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
144. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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claim for indemnity against an architect was not subject to arbitration,
since there was no arbitration agreement between the hospital and
the architect.145 The Court noted that “the relevant federal law re-
quires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbi-
tration agreement.”146 The Court reiterated that holding in Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.147 The first principle of arbitration is that
arbitration is “‘a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to sub-
mit.’”148 While efficiency concerns are important, they do not out-
weigh a party’s right to the remedy for which it bargained, whether
that remedy is arbitration or litigation.
Finally, separate adjudication for the surety and principal is not
necessarily wasteful. Although a surety and principal’s obligations are
linked, they are not identical. In some states, an arbitration award
rendered against a principal alone carries no evidentiary weight in a
proceeding against a surety.149 And in most states, the surety possesses
defenses under the bond that are not available to the principal, such
as waiver, notice and demand, statutory or contractual limitations on
actions, fraud, the “cardinal change rule,” and overpayment.150 In
their haste to compel arbitration, courts too frequently overlook these
distinctions.
In sum, although some policy arguments favor a federal rule of
decision, none of these arguments is important enough to outweigh
the Federal Arbitration Act’s overriding policy of protecting con-
tracting parties’ intentions.151
145. Id. at 19–20.
146. Id. at 20.
147. 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (“[T]he Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbi-
tration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even
where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in dif-
ferent forums.”).
148. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)
(quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
149. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2855 (West 2001).
150. Franks & Heacock, supra note 75, at 981 (“Courts have been willing to bind a surety to
the obligations of its principal because they mistakenly view their interests as being identical.”).
151. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 648 (holding that arbitration is “a matter of contract and a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit”).
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IV.  WHY STATE RULES OF DECISION ARE BETTER
Part III outlined reasons federal contract rules might be superior
to state contract rules at governing the threshold inquiry. This Part
contends that the arguments in favor of state contract law are more
persuasive. The federalist approach prescribed by the Supreme Court
in Perry is superior for at least two reasons. First, the application of
state contract law is more likely to protect the parties’ intentions.
Second, the application of state contract law preserves an important
sphere of state sovereignty.
A. Application of State Contract Law Protects Parties’ Intentions
Arbitration is a matter of contract; a party cannot be required to
submit a dispute to arbitration unless it so agreed.152 Contract law his-
torically has been the domain of the states.153 All states have well-
developed contract principles designed to protect contracting parties’
intentions. Contracting parties typically bargain against a background
of well-known contract principles. Unlike state law, federal law does
not include a well-developed set of contract principles, especially
since the Supreme Court rejected the notion of a “general common
law” in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.154 To the extent that a “federal
contract law” exists, it is an amorphous grab bag of principles redo-
lent of the era of the notorious Swift v. Tyson.155 Such principles are
not well calculated to protect contracting parties’ intentions. It is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for contracting parties to bargain against this
uncertain background.
Because of the uncertain contours of “federal contract law,”
courts that neglect state contract law are apt to apply federal per se
rules of the kind laid down by the Eleventh Circuit in decisions like
United States Fidelity.156 This rote application of a formal federal rule
152. Id. (noting that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the
parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration); United Steelworkers,
363 U.S. at 582.
153. Jones, supra note 3, at 663 (noting that contract law is typically the domain of states,
that the existence of a federal common law of contract was rejected in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and that the “very concept of ‘federal contract law’ is . . . amor-
phous”).
154. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
155. 41 (16 Pet.) U.S. 1 (1842).
156. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir.
1988).
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is less likely to realize the parties’ intentions than would a nuanced,
fact-intensive examination based on state law. Consider, for example,
the per se rule of United States Fidelity. The rule in that case would
foreclose several potentially meritorious defenses available under
state law. If, as a matter of federal law, a performance bond’s refer-
ence to the underlying agreement binds the surety to its arbitration
clause, a surety cannot defend itself by alleging that there was no
meeting of the minds, that the contract language was ambiguous or
inconsistent, that there was a mutual mistake, that the incorporation
by reference was inadequate to incorporate all terms, that industry
custom or usage dictate a certain construction, or that the agreement
was unconscionable.
The danger that federal contract law will flout the parties’ inten-
tions is especially acute in the specific factual setting of United States
Fidelity and its progeny. As a practical matter, sureties and subcon-
tractors are not likely to have intended that their incorporation by
reference of a prime contract bind them to its arbitration clause.
Large construction projects require multiple layers of contractual re-
lationships between owners, developers, contractors, subcontractors,
sub-subcontractors, lessors, sureties, and others.157 Although these
parties do not intend to be in direct contractual privity with every
other party, they often are joined by a complex web of incorporations
by reference.158 A court that fails to carefully apply state contract
principles risks binding the parties to foreign contract terms they
never intended to adopt:
The extensive tiering of contractual relationships on a construction
project can lead to the proliferation of, and the consequently unin-
tended adoption of, foreign contract terms. The owner is bound to a
general contractor that is bound to a subcontractor that is bound to
a sub-subcontractor. Although these many parties are not usually in
direct privity with all of the others, their contracts frequently include
language incorporating the terms of the other contracts by refer-
ence. Most of the standard form construction contracts contain such
provisions.159
157. Franks & Heacock, supra note 75, at 980.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Performance bonds typically reference the prime contract.160 This ref-
erence exists so that the surety will know what obligation it is assum-
ing.161 Such references exist to define the scope, quality, character, and
manner of the surety’s performance, and not necessarily the surety’s
rights and remedies.162 When a surety executes a performance bond, it
probably intends to be bound to the obligations in the bond itself, and
not to the obligations contained in the underlying agreement.163 The
surety especially does not intend to be bound by the underlying
agreement’s arbitration clause. In fact, the standard form perform-
ance bond drafted by the American Institute of Architects (which has
“virtually become scripture in the construction industry”)164 specifi-
cally contemplates adjudication, not arbitration, as the remedy for
disputes arising out of the bond.165
This conclusion that sureties do not intend to submit to arbitra-
tion when they execute a performance bond is bolstered by the fact
that many sureties consider arbitration a bad forum for resolution of
their disputes.166 The surety has no input in selecting the arbitrators or
the ground rules for arbitration, since those terms are dictated by an
agreement drafted by other parties and incorporated into the bond.
160. E.g., Am. Inst. of Architects, supra note 82, at 2 (“The Contractor and the Surety,
jointly and severally, bind themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and as-
signs to the Owner for the performance of the Construction Contract, which is incorporated
herein by reference.”).
161. Franks & Heacock, supra note 75, at 981.
162. Id.
163. 11 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 163:34 (3d ed.
1995).
164. Franks & Heacock, supra note 75, at 980 n.18.
165. See Am. Inst. of Architects, supra note 82, at 2 (“Any proceeding, legal or equitable,
under this Bond may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction in the location in which
the work or part of the work is located . . . .”).
166. Franks & Heacock, supra note 75, at 977. Sureties are not the only ones questioning the
quality of arbitration. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolu-
tion, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 55 (1987) (“[D]ramatic expansion of ADR [alternative dispute resolu-
tion, including arbitration] could harm qualitative justice in a substantive way.”); see also Stern-
light, supra note 3, at 643:
 [W]hile binding arbitration may well be preferable from the standpoint of certain
segments of society—particularly large companies that draft the terms and court ad-
ministrators and judges who can reduce their own workload—there is no reason to
believe that society as a whole is better off with binding arbitration.
See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425 (1988)
(discussing empirical data about lawyers’ and clients’ perceptions of the advantages and disad-
vantages of arbitration).
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Arbitration also is an “unfriendly forum for assertion of the surety’s
legal defenses, leading to an understandable fear that a panel of lay
arbitrators will view substantive legal defenses as ‘mere technicali-
ties.’”167 Arbitration typically is conducted by nonlawyers who might
be “wholly unqualified to decide legal issues.”168 Even if an arbitrator
is qualified, he has no duty to resolve a dispute in compliance with the
parties’ legal rights.169 Because arbitrators are paid, they may feel
market pressure to appear considerate even to parties that have
abused the rights of others.170 Also, neither discovery nor meaningful
appeal is available in arbitration.171
If courts continue to follow federal rules of decision like the one
announced in United States Fidelity, instead of applying state contract
principles to the threshold inquiry, they will subject parties (who
never intended to forego their right to a day in court) to an unfriendly
forum that inadequately protects their legal rights.
B. Application of State Contract Law Protects State Sovereignty
Perry v. Thomas teaches that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-
serves a sphere of state sovereignty, even in cases where an arbitra-
tion agreement is alleged to exist. The Act leaves states ample room
for lawmaking. State contract principles apply as long as they do not
take their “meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate
is at issue.”172 So, for example, a state legislature could enact a law
providing that clauses limiting procedural rights in standard form con-
tracts are unconscionable and voidable by consumers.173 In such a
167. Franks & Heacock, supra note 75, at 977.
168. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
169. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 19, at 345.
170. Id. at 346.
171. Id. at 347–48.
172. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
173. An effort is underway in some state legislatures to enact a model “Fair Bargain Act”
that would have this effect. New Mexico recently enacted a version of this legislation. See
Commercial Law—Enactment of Uniform Arbitration Act—Establishment of Standards for
Proceedings, 2001 N.M. Laws 1935 (providing that a clause in a standard form contract or lease
that modifies or limits procedural rights necessary or useful to a consumer, borrower, tenant, or
employee in the enforcement of substantive rights against a party drafting the standard form
contract or lease is unconscionable and is voidable by the consumer, borrower, tenant, or
employee). Plans are underway in Arkansas and Connecticut to introduce similar bills. E-mail
from Paul D. Carrington, Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, to
Charles Davant IV (June 13, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A version of the Fair
Bargain Act recently was referred to the Illinois General Assembly House Rules Committee.
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state, many arbitration agreements would be rendered invalid be-
cause of defects in the bargaining process. But under Perry, the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act would not preempt the new law.
Preserving this sphere of state sovereignty is important for an-
other reason. American federalism recognizes that the United States
has a diverse political and social culture that varies by region. As
Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar observed in a different con-
text, “Because of vast differences from region to region (such as cli-
mate, ethnicity, and industry), it is unrealistic to expect all the citizens
to possess the same goals and interests.”174 Citizens in different states
might have different expectations about contracting, and state legisla-
tures can recognize these differences better than the distant Congress.
Regional differences also permit states to perform “their role as labo-
ratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the
best solution is far from clear.”175 These benefits of federalism will
remain unrealized, however, so long as courts continue to disregard
state contract law at the threshold.
See Illinois Fair Bargain Act, House Bill 573, Illinois General Assembly (re-referred to House
Rules Committee, Apr. 6, 2001), at http://www.legis.state.il.us/legisnet/legisnet92/hbgroups/hb/
920HB0573LV.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
New Mexico enacted its version of the Fair Bargain Act as an amendment to the state’s
Arbitration Act. See Commercial Law—Enactment of Uniform Arbitration Act—Establish-
ment of Standards for Proceedings, 2001 N.M. 1935. Enacting these consumer protection provi-
sions as a part of the Uniform Arbitration Act may have been tactically unwise. E-mail from
Paul D. Carrington, supra. When a court is called upon in the future to say whether the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts these consumer protection provisions, there is a danger the court will
infer from the provisions’ placement in the Uniform Arbitration Act that the state statute was
intended to place arbitration agreements “apart from other kinds of contracts” and that the
Federal Arbitration Act therefore preempts it under Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
174. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 469 (1991).
175. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973) (stating that as each locale tailors its programs to local
needs, there is more opportunity for experimentation and innovation); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “[i]t is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single . . . State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments”).
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V.  DIFFERENT COURTS, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES: THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND VERTICAL FORUM SHOPPING
With bad precedents like United States Fidelity on the books, liti-
gants are likely to face different legal rules depending on whether
they proceed in state or federal court. This is so for two reasons. As a
practical matter, federal judges are more likely to know and consider
decisions rendered by federal courts.176 As a legal matter, federal
judges feel bound by decisions rendered by federal courts (even sus-
picious decisions like United States Fidelity).177 The same is true for
state judges and decisions rendered by state courts.178 If the federal
system is likely to apply a different rule of law than the state system,
vertical forum shopping is encouraged. Sureties and subcontractors
will seek to avoid precedents like United States Fidelity (and therefore
arbitration) by filing suit in state court. Developers and general con-
tractors will seek to take advantage of such precedents by filing suit in
federal court. If federal and state courts apply the same state contract
principles to the threshold inquiry, as instructed by the Supreme
Court, parties will be less likely to forum shop. Moreover, the parties
will be less likely to be bound by a rule of law that is foreign to their
dispute.
The case law provides ample evidence that federal courts apply-
ing federal law to the threshold inquiry reach results different from
what they would have reached under state law.179 This is so because
176. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 199, 258 (1988).
177. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124–25 (1977)
(“[F]ederal judges appear to recognize an affirmative obligation to carry out and even anticipate
the direction of the Supreme Court. Many state judges, on the other hand, appear to acknowl-
edge only an obligation not to disobey clearly established law.”).
178. Mushlin, supra note 176, at 258 (“Most of the state judge’s time is spent adjudicating
claims that arise solely under a particular state’s laws.”).
179. At the outset, it must be conceded that in many cases a federal court will reach the
proper state-law result, even though it fails to apply state law. That is because a court attempt-
ing to apply “federal contract law,” or “generally accepted principles of contract law,” may ap-
ply general contract principles identical to those of the relevant state. Moreover, a federal court
that fails to apply state law might fortuitously follow a federal precedent whose holding is iden-
tical to state precedent. That was the situation in the First Circuit’s decision in Commercial Un-
ion Insurance Co. v. Gilbane Building Co., 992 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1993). In Gilbane, the First
Circuit held that a performance bond (with no arbitration clause) that incorporated by refer-
ence a subcontract (with no arbitration clause) that incorporated by reference a prime contract
(containing an arbitration clause) created a “chain of incorporation” sufficient to bind the gen-
eral contractor to arbitrate its disputes with the surety. Id. at 388. Even if the First Circuit had
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considerable variety exists among jurisdictions as to whether a sub-
contract or performance bond bodily incorporates all the terms of an
underlying agreement or incorporates only terms related to the work
to be performed.180 Courts in a few jurisdictions have distinguished be-
tween disputes arising out of the underlying contract and disputes
arising out of the subcontract or performance bond and held that only
the former are subject to arbitration.181 Courts in a larger number of
jurisdictions have held that a reference does not bind a surety or sub-
contractor to the arbitration clause in the underlying agreement.182
Courts in a majority of jurisdictions have held that a reference does
bind a surety or subcontractor to the arbitration clause in the under-
considered local law (it did not) it would have reached the same outcome. On similar facts, Mas-
sachusetts courts have held that subcontractors and sureties are bound by arbitration clauses
contained in prime contracts which are incorporated into subcontracts or performance bonds.
See Mass. Elec. Sys., Inc. v. R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that a subcontractor was bound by the arbitration clause contained in the prime
contract, which was incorporated into the subcontract); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588
N.E.2d 705, 707 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that a guaranty and the underlying documents
were “part of one transaction and were, therefore, to be read together” to incorporate the un-
derlying agreement’s arbitration clause into the guaranty); Powers Regulator Co. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 N.E.2d 1205, 1207 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that a surety
“agreed implicitly” to arbitration as a method of determining the contractual liability of its prin-
cipal when the performance bond incorporated by reference a subcontract). Note that Powers
Regulator involved the question of whether a surety was bound to the amount of liability deter-
mined by arbitration, not the question of whether the surety was bound to participate in arbitra-
tion. 388 N.E.2d at 914. This is a slightly different question than the one decided in Gilbane and
discussed in this Note.
180. Notes 181–83 of this Note catalog for the first time all the known decisions that have
considered the question of whether a subcontract or performance bond incorporates by refer-
ence the arbitration clause in an underlying agreement.
181. Gloucester City Bd. of Educ. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 755 A.2d 1256, 1262–63 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore Contractors Corp., 397
N.E.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. 1979).
182. Grundstad v. Ritt, 106 F.3d 201, 204–05 (7th Cir. 1997); Morrie Mages & Shirlee Mages
Found. v. Thrifty Corp., 916 F.2d 402, 406 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990); Cont’l Group, Inc. v. NPS Com-
munications, Inc., 873 F.2d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 1989); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Norair
Eng’g Corp., 553 F.2d 233, 235–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat’l Shipping &
Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975); John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 429
F.2d 764, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Imp. Exp. Steel Corp. v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 351 F.2d
503, 505–06 (2d Cir. 1965); United States Pac. Builders, Inc. v. Mitsui Trust & Banking Co., 57
F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (D. Haw. 1999); S. Leo Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp.
1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Windowmaster Corp. v. B.G. Danis Co., 511 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs., 695 A.2d 153, 157 (Md.
1997); Sherwood Vill. Coop. A, Inc. v. Had-Ten Estates Corp., 287 N.Y.S.2d 921, 921 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 267 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Cumberland-Perry Area Vocational-Technical Sch. Auth. v. Bogar &
Bink, 396 A.2d 433, 434–35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v. Int’l Fid. Ins.
Co., 671 A.2d 782, 787 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
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lying agreement.183 A federal court that applies a national rule obvi-
ously will neglect these local differences.
183. Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 1998); Keystone Ship-
ping Co. v. New England Power Co., 109 F.3d 46, 52–53 (1st Cir. 1997); Asplundh Tree Expert
Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 1995); Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 331–32
(7th Cir. 1995); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 992 F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir.
1993); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venez., 991 F.2d 42, 45 (2d
Cir. 1993); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. West Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th
Cir. 1988); Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 980–81 (4th Cir. 1985); Exch. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Haskell Co., 742 F.2d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 1984); Compania Espanola de Petroleos v.
Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966, 973–74 (2d Cir. 1975); Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell
Co., 526 F.2d 777, 785–89 (3d Cir. 1975); J & S Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d
809, 810 (1st Cir. 1975); J.S. & H. Constr. Co. v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d 212,
216–17 (5th Cir. 1973); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304, 1307 n.2 (1st Cir. 1973);
Uniroyal, Inc. v. A. Epstein & Sons, Inc., 428 F.2d 523, 526–27 (7th Cir. 1970); In re S&R Co.,
984 F. Supp. 95, 98–99 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Edgewater Beach Owner’s Ass’n,
Inc., No. 96CV 256/RV, 1996 WL 509720, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 25, 1996); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. L’Energia, Ltd. P’ship, No. CIV. A. 96–10098–GAO, 1996 WL 208497, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 4,
1996); Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Collins & Co., 735 F. Supp. 1050, 1051 (N.D. Ga. 1990);
Hoffman v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 734 F. Supp. 192, 195 (D.N.J. 1990); O&Y Landmark Assocs. v.
Nordheimer, 725 F. Supp. 578, 584 (D.D.C. 1989); Thomas O’Conner & Co. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 697 F. Supp. 563, 564–65 & 565 n.1 (D. Mass. 1988); Cianbro Corp. v. Empresa Nacional
de Ingenieria, 697 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D. Me. 1988); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. Int’l Fid.
Ins. Co., 797 P.2d 622, 629 (Alaska 1990); Matson, Inc. v. Lamb & Assocs. Packaging, 947
S.W.2d 324, 325 (Ark. 1997); Slaught v. Bencomo Roofing Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618, 621–22
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Boys Club of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 8 Cal. Rptr.
2d 587, 589–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Henderson Inv. Corp. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 770,
771–72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Acousti Eng’g Co., 549 So. 2d 790, 791
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Woolley/Sweeney Hotel No. 5, 545
So. 2d 958, 958–59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Kidder Elec. of Fla., Inc. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 530 So. 2d 475, 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Balboa Ins. Co. v. W.G. Mills, Inc., 403
So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Charles W. Ackerman of
Fla., Inc., 219 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); ADC Constr. Co. v. McDaniel Grading,
Inc., 338 S.E.2d 733, 736–37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); H.R.H. Prince Ltc. Faisal M. Saud v. Batson-
Cook Co., 291 S.E.2d 249, 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Turner Constr. Co. v. Midwest Curtainwalls,
Inc., 543 N.E.2d 249, 251–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Bolingbrook Park Dist. v. National-Ben
Franklin Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Russellville Steel Co. v. A & R Exca-
vating, Inc., 624 So. 2d 11, 13 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Kearsarge Metallurgical Corp. v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 418 N.E.2d 580, 582–83 (Mass. 1981); Mass. Elec. v. R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc., 594 N.E.2d
545, 545–46 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 707
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Powers Regulator Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 N.E.2d
1205, 1207 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hayes Contractors, Inc., 389 N.W.2d
257, 259–60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Sheffield Assembly of God Church, Inc. v. Am. Ins. Co., 870
S.W.2d 926, 931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Monette v. Tinsley, 975 P.2d 361, 364 (N.M. Ct. App.
1999); City of Piqua v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 617 N.E.2d 780, 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Gib-
bons-Grable Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 517 N.E.2d 559, 562–64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Godwin v.
Smith, 386 S.E.2d 464, 465–67 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); First Baptist Church v. George A. Creed &
Son, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 121, 123 (S.C. 1981); Rashid v. Schenck Constr. Co., 438 S.E.2d 543, 547
(W. Va. 1993).
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A federal district court’s 1990 decision in Hoffman v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co.184 provides a good example of how a federal court’s fail-
ure to apply state law can lead to a questionable result.185 In Hoffman,
184. 734 F. Supp. 192, 195 (D.N.J. 1990). For a discussion of how the Hoffman court errone-
ously concluded that state law is not applicable, see supra note 110.
185. Consider also the Seventh Circuit’s 1996 decision in Grundstad v. Ritt, 106 F.3d 201 (7th
Cir. 1996). That decision held that a guarantor was not bound to arbitrate a dispute arising out
of an underlying noncompetition agreement. Id. at 205. To understand how the decision would
differ under state law, it is necessary to consider the facts in some detail. Two corporations in
the business of operating gambling casinos on cruise ships entered into a noncompetition
agreement. Id. at 202. Under the agreement, Atlantic Associates, Inc., promised to pay a yearly
sum to International Vending and Gaming, Ltd., in exchange for International Vending’s
promise not to compete with Atlantic in certain geographic areas. Id. The noncompetition
agreement contained a broad arbitration clause. Id. After Atlantic failed to make payments due
under the agreement, Ritt (as assignee of International Vending’s rights) received an arbitration
award of over $842,000, which he converted to a judgment in a Massachusetts state court. Id. at
202–03. When Atlantic refused to make payment, Ritt sought to initiate an arbitration pro-
ceeding against Grundstad and Rahn, Atlantic shareholders who had guaranteed Atlantic’s per-
formance of the noncompetition agreement. Id. at 203. The guaranty, which did not contain an
arbitration clause, appeared on the final page of the noncompetition agreement, immediately
beneath the signatures of Ritt and Rahn as signatories to the agreement on behalf of Interna-
tional Vending and Atlantic Associates, respectively. Id. The agreement and the guaranty were
executed the same day and made reference to each other. Id.
The Seventh Circuit held as a matter of federal law that the guaranty and the noncom-
petition agreement should not be read together. Id. at 205. The court followed a federal case
from the Sixth Circuit holding that a guarantor who is not a signatory to a contract containing
an arbitration clause generally is not bound by the arbitration clause. Id. at 204 (citing, with ap-
proval, Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court noted
that the language of the Grundstad guaranty “does not unambiguously express Grundstad’s in-
tent to be personally bound by the arbitration clause within the [noncompetition] Agreement.”
Id. at 205. In the absence of language specifically stating that the guarantor would be bound by
the arbitration clause, the court would not hold as a matter of law that he agreed to be so
bound. Id.
Had the Grundstad court properly applied Illinois law (which the Seventh Circuit later
acknowledged would have been applicable to this diversity case, 166 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.
1999) (on rehearing after remand)), the court likely would have concluded that the guaranty
should be construed with the noncompetition agreement as a single contract. The general rule in
Illinois is
that in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, where two or more instru-
ments are executed by the same contracting parties in the course of the same transac-
tion, the instruments will be considered together and construed with reference to one
another because they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract.
Tepfer v. Deerfield Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 454 N.E.2d 676, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (citations omit-
ted) (holding that mortgage note should be read together with a contemporaneously executed
loan commitment document); see also Frocks v. Ziff, 74 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ill. 1947) (holding that
an option to buy realty should be construed with a lease when the option was part of the same
physical document as the lease); Meeker v. Beeson, 395 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(holding that a purchase agreement and a leasing agreement not executed simultaneously could
be read as constituting a single transaction, where the “latter document neither expressly con-
tradicted nor superceded the prior instrument and could be reasonably interpreted as supple-
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the owner of a warehouse sought to compel the contractor’s surety to
participate in arbitration.186 The construction agreement between the
menting and clarifying the prior agreement”). Here, the guaranty was executed by Grundstad
and Ritt on the same day that the noncompetition agreement was executed by Grundstad and
Ritt on behalf of International Vending and Atlantic Associates. Grundstad, 106 F.3d at 202.
The guaranty and noncompetition agreement not only made reference to each other, they were
joined together as part of a single document. Id. at 203. Both agreements served the purpose of
“‘facilitat[ing] Ritt’s departure from Atlantic [Associates].’” Id. at 202. Because the guaranty
and the noncompetition agreement were executed by the same parties, for the same purpose, at
the same time, a court applying Illinois law likely would conclude that the agreements constitute
a single transaction.
It might be argued that a guaranty and its underlying agreement are never executed for
“the same purpose,” since the purpose of the former is to guarantee the obligations of the latter.
But there is precedent in Illinois for the proposition that a guaranty and the underlying agree-
ment should be construed together. Fisher v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 39 N.E.2d 67, 68–
71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1942); McComb v. Meade, 256 Ill. App. 128, 137–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1930)
(holding that a note executed by a bank trustee and a guaranty and covenant of the bank not to
sue, executed as part of same transaction, were required to be construed as one contract);
Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 241 Ill. App. 583, 586–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1926) (holding that a
bond guaranteeing a project against defects must be considered a part of the construction
contract); Webbe v. Romona Oolitic Stone Co., 58 Ill. App. 222, 225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1894)
(holding that a guaranty should be read with reference to the memorandum of settlement
preceding it). Modern decisions in other states also have interpreted a guaranty as part of the
same contract as other contemporaneously executed agreements. E.g., Spottiswoode v. Levine,
730 A.2d 166, 173 (Me. 1999) (“Since the guaranty and commitment letters were ‘executed at
the same time, by the same contracting parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the
same transaction,’ we consider and construe them together as one contract or instrument.”).
These cases likely would be persuasive to a court ascertaining Illinois law.
Moreover, Illinois courts have been quite willing to require nonsignatories to arbitrate
disputes. In Illinois, arbitration is a favored method of settling disputes. Turner Constr. Co. v.
Midwest Curtainwalls, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Kostakos v. KSN Joint
Venture No. 1, 491 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). The Appellate Court of Illinois has
held that sureties as a matter of law agree to arbitrate disputes when their bond incorporates by
reference an underlying agreement, even if the reference says nothing about whether the rights
and remedies of the parties to the underlying agreement are available to the parties to the bond.
Bolingbrook Park Dist. v. National-Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 420 N.E. 2d 741, 743 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (noting that the bond stated that “‘Contractor has by written agreement . . . entered into a
contract with Owner . . . which contract is by reference made a part hereof, and is hereinafter
referred to as the Contract’”); see also Turner, 543 N.E.2d at 252 (holding that a general con-
tractor was obliged to arbitrate disputes with a subcontractor, despite the absence of an arbitra-
tion clause in the subcontract, when the subcontract incorporated by reference a general con-
tract containing an arbitration clause). Although the incorporation cases would not directly
dictate the outcome in Grundstad (since the Grundstad guaranty did not incorporate the un-
derlying agreement), the cases evince a policy in Illinois of construing guaranties broadly to ef-
fectuate arbitration agreements. A court applying Illinois law likely would do the same.
Had the Grundstad court properly considered basic Illinois contract principles, devel-
opments in other states, and the Illinois cases, it likely would have concluded that the guaranty
and the noncompetition agreement were part of the same contract and that the guarantor was
bound to submit to arbitration. Because the Seventh Circuit failed to apply state law, it reached
the opposite outcome.
186. Hoffman, 734 F. Supp. at 193.
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owner and the contractor contained an arbitration clause.187 As surety,
Fidelity had executed and delivered to the owner a performance bond
that incorporated the construction agreement by reference.188 The
bond did not include an arbitration clause. Claiming that the contrac-
tor’s workmanship was faulty, the owner instigated an arbitration
against the contractor and asked the district court to compel the
surety to participate. The Hoffman court ignored state law and fol-
lowed inapposite federal decisions from other circuits. Had the court
correctly applied New Jersey contract law,189 it might not have or-
dered Fidelity to proceed to arbitration.
New Jersey law provides no specific answer to the question of
whether a surety has agreed to submit to arbitration by referencing a
construction contract containing an arbitration clause. In fact, the
New Jersey Supreme Court considered—and explicitly reserved—
that exact question three years before Hoffman.190 A later New Jersey
case (decided one year before Hoffman) lent support to the proposi-
187. Id. at 193. Under the construction agreement, “‘[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters
in question between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of or related to this Agreement
or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration or litigation, at the election of the owner.’”
Id.
188. Id. (“‘Contractor has by written agreement . . . entered into a contract with Owner for
construction of a Building Addition . . . which contract is by reference made a part hereof, and is
hereinafter referred to as the Contract.’”).
189. The relevant law comes from New Jersey. Federal district courts must apply the con-
flicts law of the states in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941). Under New Jersey conflicts law, the validity of a contract for the rendition of services
and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties, by the local law of the state where the contract requires that the services, or a major
portion of the services, be rendered, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied. McCabe v. Great Pac. Century Co., 537 A.2d 303, 304–06
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that New Jersey law applied to a construction contract
when the building would be built in New Jersey). In Hoffman, the contract was to be performed
in New Jersey and arbitration was to occur in New Jersey. 734 F. Supp. at 193, 195. There was
no evidence of a choice-of-law clause, nor was there evidence that another state had a relation-
ship to the transaction. Therefore, New Jersey should have provided the law relevant to the
rights and liabilities of the parties under the construction agreement.
190. Raymond Int’l Builders, Inc. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 516 A.2d 620, 623 (1986)
(following citations to cases on both sides of the question, the court stated that it “need not
reach this issue” and proceeded to decide the case on other grounds not important to this Note);
see also Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 537 A.2d 310, 314 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988) (observing that in Raymond the New Jersey Supreme Court “did not deem it
necessary to decide whether, in those circumstances, the surety is subject to joinder by the credi-
tor in an arbitration proceeding initially brought against the principal pursuant to the creditor–
principal contract”). There is still no firm answer to that question under New Jersey law.
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tion that a surety is free to ignore arbitration proceedings.191 (The fed-
eral court in Hoffman did not cite either New Jersey case, nor did it
acknowledge that New Jersey law is unsettled on this point.)192
Even though New Jersey law provides no formal interpretive
rule to resolve the dispute in Hoffman, basic New Jersey contract
principles suggest that the district court reached an improper result.
In New Jersey, a contract is ambiguous where the terms of the con-
tract are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, or
where the contract language can support reasonable differences of
opinion as to the obligations undertaken.193 Here, the incorporation
by reference was susceptible to more than one interpretation. The
reference could have meant that the surety agreed that it would pos-
sess the exact rights and submit to the exact remedies of its principal,
including arbitration. The reference also could have meant that the
surety guaranteed the scope, quality, character, and manner of the
nonsignatory’s performance, but did not submit to the principal’s pro-
cedures for dispute resolution. Language in the construction agree-
ment supported the latter interpretation. The construction agree-
ment—never signed by the surety—provided that disputes “between
the parties to this Agreement” were subject to arbitration.194 Moreo-
ver, the performance bond did not contain an arbitration clause.195
Had the parties intended to subject the surety to arbitration, the per-
formance bond would be the most logical place to include an arbitra-
tion clause. Indeed, most standard form performance bonds contain
provisions for remedies, such as forum-selection or choice-of-law
clauses.196 Because the construction agreement, as incorporated into
191. Seaboard, 537 A.2d at 314 (holding that a surety may submit voluntarily to arbitration
or ignore arbitration, although if the surety takes the latter course “it will be bound by the arbi-
tration award against the principal if it was adequately noticed of the arbitration proceeding,
afforded the time and information necessary to prepare for arbitration and kept informed at
every stage of the arbitration proceeding”).
192. When state law is unsettled, federal courts have discretion to make use of state certifi-
cation procedures to allow state courts to develop their own law. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386, 389–91 (1974). But New Jersey has no certification procedure. RTC Mortgage Trust
1994 N-1 v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334, 352 n.18 (D.N.J. 1997).
193. Camden & Trenton Ry. Co. v. Adams, 51 A. 24, 25 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (“If the contract as
written is so ambiguous that its expressions are susceptible of more than one meaning, evidence
of the accompanying negotiations is admitted in order to point out which meaning was within
the intent of the parties.”).
194. Hoffman v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 734 F. Supp. 192, 193 (D.N.J. 1990) (emphasis added).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Architects, supra note 82, at 2 (“Any proceeding, legal or equita-
ble, under this Bond may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction in the location in
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the performance bond, was susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion, the agreement was ambiguous as a matter of New Jersey law.
In New Jersey, if the language of a contract is ambiguous, evi-
dence may be admitted as to the intent of the parties, and the deter-
mination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact (for a jury).197 In
light of the agreement’s ambiguity, the district court should have at-
tempted to ascertain the intention of the parties through parol evi-
dence of the accompanying negotiations and customs and usage in the
construction bond industry. A proper application of New Jersey law
should have caused the district court to conduct a full-blown eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the intentions of the parties to the per-
formance bond. In New Jersey, formal interpretative rules (like the
per se rule followed by the Hoffman court) are readily subordinated
to the policy of ascertaining and effectuating the contemplation or
common intention of parties.198 Had the Hoffman court considered
New Jersey law—as a New Jersey court likely would have done—it
would not have granted summary judgment in favor of arbitration.
Cases like Hoffman, in which the result depended in part on the
forum, encourage litigants to seek the forum most likely to apply a
favorable law. And, as the Supreme Court noted in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, “mischievous results” ensue when federal courts apply
“general law” different from the law in the state courts.199
which the work or part of the work is located . . . .”); Am. Inst. of Architects, Performance
Bond, supra note 86, at 2 (specifying that any “suit” under the bond be instituted within certain
time limits). The use of the noun “suit” in Document A311/CM suggests that adjudication—not
arbitration—is the prescribed method of dispute resolution.
197. Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 140 A.2d 199, 204 (N.J. 1958); Anthony L. Petters
Diner, Inc. v. Stellakis, 493 A.2d 1261, 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that where
a contract term’s meaning is uncertain or ambiguous, its meaning will depend upon parol evi-
dence admitted in aid of interpretation, and the meaning of the doubtful provisions will be a
question of fact); Camden, 51 A. at 25–26.
198. Ace Stone, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 221 A.2d 515, 520 (N.J. 1966) (remanding a dis-
pute over an ambiguous contract “to enable the parties to introduce such oral and documentary
evidence as may be available and relevant in aid of interpretation”).
199. The Supreme Court’s description in Erie of the “mischievous results” of the Swift v.
Tyson doctrine describes the results of federal courts’ failure to apply state law to the threshold
inquiry in the Arbitration Act context:
Swift v. Tyson . . . . made rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court
. . . . In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States,
the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the
State.
304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938).
Critics of the application of state law to the threshold question might argue that the
Supreme Court’s teaching in Perry encourages horizontal forum shopping, even while it dis-
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CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, the
Act was understood to be a procedural statute that supplemented—
not supplanted—state contract law. During the last thirty years, the
Supreme Court has recast the Act as a national regulatory statute that
leaves little role for state law.
The Court has permitted only one exception to this nationalist
trend. In Perry v. Thomas and subsequent decisions, the Court in-
structed lower courts to apply general state contract law to questions
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of arbitration
agreements. But this federalist thread has gone virtually unnoticed in
the crazy quilt of Arbitration Act jurisprudence. Because of the com-
plexity of the Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions, courts have ne-
glected to observe generally applicable state contract rules. They have
continued to follow federal court decisions. As a result, the benefits
of federalism have not been realized in the arbitration context. Par-
ties who bargained against the background of state contract law are
finding themselves bound by foreign rules of law. Parties are being
forced to arbitrate disputes they never intended to arbitrate. States’
prerogative to enact laws for the protection of their citizens is threat-
ened. And vertical forum shopping is encouraged, as litigants seek fa-
vorable rules of law.
courages vertical forum shopping. A litigant seeking to avoid arbitration might seek a forum
state where the local contract principles are more favorable to its defenses. But horizontal fo-
rum shopping is not likely to be a problem and, in any event, it is likely to be less of a problem
than vertical forum shopping. This is so for two reasons, one theoretical, one practical. First,
horizontal forum shopping is less troublesome than vertical forum shopping. Horizontal forum
shopping is an important aspect of America’s federal system. As the Supreme Court noted in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electronic Manufacturing Co., “[w]hatever lack of uniformity this may
produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which
leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local poli-
cies diverging from those of its neighbors.” 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Second, as a practical mat-
ter, horizontal forum shopping is unlikely to occur. Standard form agreements almost invariably
contain a choice-of-law clause stating which state’s law will govern the interpretation of the
document. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Architects, General Conditions, supra note 86, § 13.1.1 (“The
Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located.”). Moreover, a
plaintiff’s choice of forum will be limited by the constitutional requirement that the forum have
at least some minimal contacts with the parties and the litigation before it may apply its law. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (“[F]or a State’s substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”). Most litigants therefore face little, if any, choice as be-
tween different states’ contract laws.
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Only when lawyers bring to courts’ attention the full significance
of Perry and its federalist progeny (such as First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan) will its benefits be realized. Arbitration is supposed to
be purely a matter of contract, a process that cannot be compelled
unless a party intended to forego a judicial forum for the resolution of
disputes. The sedulous application of state contract principles, as
mandated by recent Supreme Court decisions, remains the best way
to protect parties against the unintended waiver of their right to judi-
cial redress.
